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Europe	1992:	economic	implications	for	Asia	
David	Lim	
Griffith	University	
The	European	Economic	Community	(EEC)	was	formed	in	1957	with	the	signing	of	the	Treaty	
of	Rome.	This	brought	together	six	countries	(Belgium,	France,	West	Germany,	Italy,	
Luxemburg	and	the	Netherlands)	which	were	involved	in	the	conflict	of	the	Second	World	
War.	The	impetus	for	the	establishment	of	the	EEC	was	political	but	the	economic	gains	
from	the	operation	of	the	scheme,	popularly	known	as	the	Common	Market,	were	so	
significant	that	eventually	the	original	membership	of	six	was	doubled	to	include	Denmark,	
Greece,	Ireland,	Portugal,	Spain	and	the	United	Kingdom.	
The	so-called	Europe	1992	Project	aims	to	bring	about	further	economic	co-	operation	in	the	
EEC,	now	known	as	the	European	Community	(EC),	by	removing	all	the	current	major	
obstacles	to	intra-European	trade.	These	include	red	tape	and	border	regulations,	restrictive	
government	procurement	practices,	differences	in	technical	regulations	and	standards,	and	
differences	in	tax	regulations,	accounting	standards	and	social	security	laws.	
The	impetus	for	the	1992	plan	is	the	belief	that	these	barriers	were	largely	responsible	for	
the	EC	having	lower	output,	investment,	productivity	and	employment	growth	rates	and	
higher	inflation	rates	than	the	USA	and	Japan.	The	EC	also	did	not	do	as	well	in	the	export	
market.	In	the	period	1979-85,	its	share	in	the	world	export	market	fell	in	spite	of	a	35	per	
cent	decrease	in	its	effective	exchange	rate.	The	poor	export	performance	was	especially	
noticeable	in	the	industries	of	the	future,	such	as	information	technology,	electrical	and	
office	equipment	and	telecommunications.	
The	Europe	1992	Project	has	generated	a	great	deal	of	interest	and	anxiety,	not	least	among	
the	major	trading	nations	of	Asia.	This	article	examines	the	economic	and	trade	implications	
of	the	1992	program	for	these	countries.	
The	plan	
If	realised,	the	Europe	1992	plan	will	represent	a	very	high	level	of	economic	cooperation.	
The	lowest	level	of	cooperation	is	the	formation	of	a	free-trade	area,	where	member	
countries	remove	trade	barriers	among	themselves	but	maintain	their	own	separate	
national	barriers	against	trade	with	the	outside	world.	The	1992	plan	goes	beyond	this	as	
well	as	the	next	stage	of	forming	a	customs	union,	where	member	countries	maintain	no	
obstacles	on	trade	with	each	other	and	have	the	same	set	of	obstacles	against	trade	with	
non-member	countries.	From	1957	to	now	the	EC	has	operated	such	a	system,	together	
with	other	arrangements.	The	1992	plan	aims	for	a	common	market	where	a	customs	union	
operates	and	where	there	is	complete	freedom	of	movement	for	capital	and	labour.	The	
highest	stage	of	economic	cooperation	will	be	full	economic	union	where	member	countries	
become,	in	effect,	part	of	a	bigger	country,	under	the	same	set	of	economic	policies.	
The	fears	that	the	trading	nations	of	Asia	have	of	the	Europe	1992	plan	are	in	the	following	
areas:	
• By	abolishing	all	trade	barriers	among	the	member	countries,	the	plan	will	
encourage	them	to	buy	from	each	other	and	divert	trade	from	non-	member	
countries,	even	though	the	latter	might	be	more	efficient.	This	is	the	so-called	trade	
diversion	effect.	
• Combining	a	population	of	325	million	people	with	very	high	income	levels,	the	plan	
will	give	the	group	extraordinary	bargaining	strength	and	drawing	power.	These	will	
be	used	as	leverage	to	open	foreign	markets	or	to	keep	out	all	those	whose	markets	
are	highly	protected,	on	terms	which	are	favourable	to	the	EC.	This	is	the	so-called	
"Fortress	Europe"	effect.	
• The	EC	may	give	special	trade	preferences	to	eastern	Europe	and	divert	its	private	
and	official	capital	flows	to	it	at	the	expense	of	Asian	countries.	Some	diversion	may	
also	take	place	with	funds	from	richer	EC	countries	going	to	poorer	EC	countries	such	
as	Spain	and	Portugal	rather	than	to	Asian	countries.	
Trade	diversion	
This	fear	is	based	on	the	fact	that	the	EC	is	an	important	market	for	Asian	exports	and	that	
the	EC	has	increased	its	overall	level	of	protection	against	developing	countries	in	the	1980s.	
Table	1	shows	that	the	EC's	share	of	Asian	exports	in	1989	was	over	30	per	cent	and	had	
increased	over	the	1980-89	period.	The	EC	was	also	the	second	most	important	destination	
after	the	US.	For	South	Asian	countries	it	remained	the	most	important	export	market.	
		
The	increase	in	the	EC's	share	of	Asian	exports	hides	some	very	disturbing	trends.	Protection	
in	EC	has	become	more	discriminatory	against	certain	products	from	certain	countries	and	
also	very	sophisticated	and	non-transparent.	The	newly	industrialising	economies	(NIEs),	
especially	those	in	Asia,	have	been	affected	particularly	and	the	second-generation	
exporting	nations	from	Asia	have	also	been	increasingly	targeted.	Non-tariff	barriers	have	
replaced	tariffs,	and	among	the	non-tariff	barriers	quantitative	restrictions	have	been	
replaced	by	voluntary	export	restraints,	surveillance	and	anti-dumping	procedures	which	
are	partly	outside	the	jurisdiction	of	the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	(GATT).	
These	changes	in	the	nature	of	protection	have	made	it	easier	for	the	EC	to	camouflage	its	
level	of	protection	and	more	difficult	for	its	competitors	to	break	into	or	maintain	their	
share	of	the	EC	market.	
In	contrast	to	these	trade	restrictions,	the	EC's	trade	preferences	to	developing	countries	
are	of	limited	value.	They	are	generous	for	the	export	of	manufactured	goods	from	
countries	which	cannot	supply	them,	such	as	the	African,	Caribbean	and	Pacific	(ACP)	
countries	of	the	Lomé	Convention,	and	much	less	so	for	the	export	of	agricultural	and	
manufactured	goods	from	those	which	can.		
The	fear	that	the	trade	diversion	effect	will	be	substantial	is	not	allayed	by	the	stand	taken	
by	the	EC	in	the	Uruguay	Round.	It	has	not	been	keen	to	reduce	agricultural	protection	or	to	
give	up	the	principle	of	special	treatment	and	selectivity	in	its	trade	with	non-EC	countries.	
It	should	be	pointed	out	that	the	negative	trade	diversion	effect	from	the	establishment	of	a	
trade	bloc	may	be	offset	by	the	positive	trade	creation	effect.	This	refers	to	the	possibility	of	
new	trade	between	the	member	countries	of	the	EC	once	barriers	to	trade	are	removed,	
when	some	of	them	will	be	encouraged	to	replace	domestically	produced	goods	by	goods	
produced	more	efficiently	by	other	member	countries.	
It	has	been	estimated	that	this	reallocation	of	production	activities,	together	with	the	free	
movement	of	capital	and	labour,	will	bring	about	structural	change	and	increase	the	EC's	
GDP	by	1	per	cent	per	year	well	into	the	1990s.1	Other	important	economic	gains	are	an	
average	annual	decrease	of	6.1	per	cent	in	the	level	of	consumer	prices,	an	improvement	in	
the	budget	by	an	average	of	2.2	per	cent	of	GDP,	an	improvement	in	the	external	balance	by	
an	average	of	1	per	cent	of	GDP,	and	1.8	million	jobs	being	created	which	would	reduce	the	
unemployment	rate	by	1.5	per	cent.	
If	the	income	elasticity	of	import	demand	remains	the	same	over	the	1990s,	the	resulting	
increase	in	the	EC's	imports	will	be	far	greater	than	the	resulting	decrease	from	the	trade	
diversion.	It	has	been	estimated	that	an	annual	increase	in	the	GDP	of	1	per	cent	will	
increase	imports	by	5.5	per	cent	per	year,	with	the	trade	diversion	being	no	more	than	one	
fifth	of	the	increase	in	import	demand.2	The	major	beneficiaries	of	the	increase	in	EC's	
import	demand	will	be	countries	which	can	supply	manufactured	goods	and	services	at	
competitive	prices,	and	this	includes	the	major	trading	nations	of	Asia.	Those	countries	
which	export	primary	products	will	benefit	less	as	technology	in	Europe	continues	to	save	
on	raw	materials	and	to	conserve	the	environment.	
A	recent	study	on	the	ex	ante	effect	of	the	EC	1992	plan	on	South	Korean	exports	to	the	EC	
suggests	that	too	much	has	been	made	of	the	adverse	effects.3	The	plan	will	produce	an	
immediate	static	effect	in	reducing	the	prices	of	EC	goods:	trading	costs	will	be	reduced	
from	less	delay	at	the	frontier	as	will	production	costs	from	greater	competition	and	
economies	of	large-scale	production.	However,	this	will	reduce	Korean	exports	to	the	EC	by	
only	2.4	per	cent	on	the	average.	There	is	also	a	long-term	dynamic	effect	which	will	reduce	
it	by	5.6	per	cent.	These	losses	will	be	insignificant	compared	to	the	increase	in	exports	
generated	by	the	increase	in	the	EC's	GDP.	
Fortress	Europe	
The	second	area	of	concern	that	the	trading	nations	of	Asia	have	of	the	1992	Europe	plan	is	
that	it	may	operate	as	"Fortress	Europe".	It	may	erect	substantially	more	barriers	against	
competition	from	the	rest	of	the	world	in	an	attempt	to	reduce	the	overall	competitive	
shock	from	having	a	single	European	market,	or	it	may	make	use	of	its	enormous	combined	
strength	to	extract	unfair	gains	from	the	rest	of	the	world.	
Possible	forms	of	the	move	towards	"Fortress	Europe"	might	include	the	following:	
• EC	members	might	impose	on	non-members	the	harshest	form	of	protection	
currently	used	by	one	of	them	while	abolishing	such	restrictions	among	themselves.	
This	might	happen	with	textiles	and	automobiles	which	are	among	a	small	number	of	
products	on	which	national	quotas	are	still	imposed.	
• The	EC	might	deny	national	treatment	for	non-EC	firms	seeking	to	enter	the	EC	
market	through	the	establishment	of	subsidiaries,	so	that	foreign-	owned	
subsidiaries	are	treated	less	favourably	than	domestically-owned	ones.	
• The	EC	could	interpret	the	principle	of	reciprocity	strictly	so	that	foreign-	owned	
subsidiaries	would	be	granted	the	benefits	of	the	integrated	market	only	if	EC	
subsidiaries	in	the	foreign	country	were	to	enjoy	similar	benefits.	
The	move	towards	"Fortress	Europe"	may	materialise	because	of	the	more	protectionist	and	
discriminatory	trade	policies	pursued	by	the	EC	over	the	last	twenty	years	and	the	
increasing	use	of	non-tariff	barriers,	as	noted	already.	There	is	also	talk	in	official	documents	
and	statements	from	the	EC	of	the	integrated	internal	market	giving	the	EC	the	negotiating	
leverage	to	obtain	global	reciprocity,	as	well	as	sectoral	reciprocity	in	certain	areas	not	
covered	by	GATT,	especially	services.	
The	decision	by	a	large	number	of	Japanese	manufacturers	(for	example,	Fujitsu,	
Matsushita,	Mitsubishi,	Toshiba	and	Toyota)	and	banks	(for	example,	Fuji	Bank	and	the	
Industrial	Bank	of	Japan)	to	establish	themselves	in	Europe	has	undoubtedly	been	prompted	
by	the	fear	that	firms	not	established	in	Europe	will	not	have	fair	access	to	the	lucrative	
European	market.	This	fear	is	not	unfounded	as	the	EC	has	made	greater	use	of	anti-
dumping	duties	against	Japanese	producers	of	printers,	cassettes,	video	tapes,	photocopiers	
and	electrical	motors.	As	a	result	of	this	fear,	direct	Japanese	investment	in	Europe	has	been	
growing	at	around	90	per	cent	a	year.	
There	is	also	some	evidence	to	show	that	Japanese	or	other	non-European	firms,	once	
established	in	Europe,	might	have	been	discriminated	against.	Standards	and	regulations	
might	have	been	set	to	favour	European	firms,	strict	local	content	rules	could	have	been	
enforced	and	public	procurement	contracts	have	not	been	granted	to	non-European	firms	in	
spite	of	much	more	competitive	bids	from	them.	An	example	is	the	decision	by	the	Spanish	
Government	to	accept	French	and	German	tenders	for	its	high-speed	railway	system	in	spite	
of	these	being	30	per	cent	higher	than	a	tender	by	Mitsubishi.	
The	extent	to	which	these	measures	become	a	permanent	feature	of	the	EC	after	1992	will	
depend	on	the	outcome	of	debate	among	EC	countries	themselves	on	the	relative	merits	of	
competition	and	regulation.	Some	countries	believe	that	the	prime	objective	of	the	1992	
scheme	is	to	give	European	firms	a	competitive	edge	over	non-EC	ones,	whereas	others	
believe	that	it	is	to	encourage	greater	competition	and	freer	trade.	All	the	major	decisions	
are	still	pending.	
What	is	clear	so	far	is	that	with	its	bargaining	strength	the	EC	will	insist	and	be	accorded	
rules	of	reciprocity	which	would	deny	Asian	firms/countries	access	to	the	European	market	
unless	equal	access	is	granted	to	European	firms/countries.	The	implementation	of	such	
reciprocity	rules	will	affect	small	and	open	trading	nations	such	as	Australia	very	
significantly.	Suppose	the	EC	insists	that	Northeast	Asia	buys	more	of	its	subsidised	
agricultural	products	before	allowing	it	greater	access	to	the	EC	market	for	manufactured	
goods.	Australia	accounts	for	2	per	cent	and	3.7	per	cent	of	Northeast	Asian	exports	and	
imports	respectively.	These	figures	show	Australia	to	be	an	unimportant	trading	partner	as	
far	as	Northeast	Asia	is	concerned.	Under	pressure	and	threat	from	the	EC	and	because	of	
the	size	of	the	EC	market	(US$3,794	billion),	there	is	little	doubt	that	Northeast	Asia	will	
reduce	its	import	of	cheaper	Australian	agricultural	products	rather	than	reduce	its	
domestic	production	of	such	products	in	order	to	accede	to	the	EC's	request.	
If	the	1992	Europe	plan	results	in	a	North	American	trading	bloc,	the	situation	for	Australia	
would	be	worse.	The	North	American	trading	bloc	could	exert	the	same	type	of	pressure	on	
Northeast	Asia.	As	it	accounts	for	39	per	cent	and	21	per	cent	of	Northeast	Asian	exports	
and	imports	respectively,	and	has	a	market	of	270	million	people	and	a	GDP	of	US$4,509	
billion,	there	is	also	little	doubt	that	Australian	interests	would	again	be	sacrificed.	
Diversion	of	funds	from	Asia	
The	third	area	of	concern	is	that	the	EC	1992	plan	will	divert	private	and	public	EC	capital	
away	from	Asian	countries.	This	would	happen	for	two	reasons.	The	first	is	that	the	newer	
and	poorer	EC	members,	Spain	and	Portugal,	will	compete	with	developing	Asian	countries	
for	private	investment	from	richer	EC	countries	because	they	have	more	or	less	the	same	
factor	endowments.	As	members	of	the	EC,	Spain	and	Portugal	will	have	a	huge	advantage,	
one	that	will	be	further	strengthened	by	the	operation	of	the	Regional	Fund	of	the	EC	
Commission	which	subsidises	capital	expenditure	in	the	less	developed	areas	of	the	EC.	In	
the	absence	of	the	1992	Europe	plan,	private	investment	fund	could	have	found	its	way	to	
Asia.	
The	second	reason	is	the	special	trade	and	aid	programs	which	have	been	worked	out	for	
eastern	European	countries	to	help	them	develop	their	market	economic	systems.	The	EC	
has	agreed	to	give	these	countries	preferential	market	access	and	the	newly	established	
European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	and	other	Western	donors	appear	
keen	to	support	the	reform	process	with	massive	injections	of	public	funds.	If	the	granting	
of	special	trade	preferences	and	special	aid	programs	to	eastern	Europe	were	to	result	in	
the	successful	economic	transformation	of	their	economies,	this	would	increase	the	EC's	
private	investment	in	them	and	reduce	such	investment	in	the	developing	nations	of	Asia.	It	
might	also	increase	investment	in	the	EC	to	facilitate	exports	to	eastern	Europe,	thereby	
reducing	further	direct	foreign	investment	in	Asia.	
While	such	a	development	might	come	about	even	without	the	1992	Europe	plan,	it	would	
be	more	likely	with	it	in	place.	The	EC	would	like	to	see	the	East	European	countries	adopt	
political	and	economic	systems	which	are	similar	to	its	own.	As	the	1992	Europe	plan	is	
supposed	to	demonstrate	the	superiority	of	factor	and	trade	mobility	under	a	market-
determined	economic	system,	the	EC	would	be	particularly	keen	to	help	the	eastern	
European	countries	integrate	into	the	international	division	of	labour.	
The	concern	that	western	European	private	and	public	funds	will	be	diverted	from	Asia	may	
be	exaggerated.	First,	direct	foreign	investment	has	already	begun	to	move	away	from	
developing	countries	as	a	group	(table	2).	The	share	of	the	Asian	NIEs	and	near-NIEs	in	the	
total	direct	foreign	investment	went	down	from	6.6	per	cent	in	1980-84	to	5.5	per	cent	in	
1988,	though	their	share	in	the	direct	foreign	investment	going	to	developing	countries	
went	up	and	by	1988	had	accounted	for	half	of	this.	Second,	over	the	1980s	the	EC	had	
become	a	more	attractive	place	for	investment	for	both	EC	and	non-EC	countries,	with	Spain	
and	Portugal	being	preferred.	This	pro-EC	investment	trend	will	be	strengthened	by	the	
1992	plan	as	the	EC	provides	subsidies	for	investment	in	its	peripheral	areas	and	as	non-EC	
investors	move	in	to	benefit	from	its	larger	market	and	for	fear	of	the	EC	adopting	a	
predatory	policy.	However,	the	point	is	that	the	EC	1992	plan	will	only	continue	a	trend	
which	began	some	years	back.	Third,	with	economic	growth	in	Spain	and	Portugal,	labour	
costs	will	rise	and	make	them	less	attractive	investment	destinations.	Their	participation	in	
the	European	Monetary	System	will	also	mean	that	they	cannot	adjust	their	exchange	rates	
to	deal	with	rising	labour	costs.	Moreover,	the	social	harmonisation	program	of	the	EC	will	
reduce	the	inter-country	differences	in	labour	costs.	As	a	result,	Spain	and	Portugal	will	lose	
their	comparative	advantage	in	labour-	intensive	activities	and	attention	will	switch	back	to	
the	developing	Asian	countries.	
		
The	concern	that	political	and	economic	developments	in	eastern	Europe	will	divert	funds	
from	Asia	may	also	be	exaggerated.	Most	of	these	countries	are	heavily	indebted	in	hard	
currencies	and	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	they	will	be	able	to	borrow	significant	amounts	from	
the	private	capital	market.	Their	ability	to	absorb	direct	foreign	investment	and	foreign	aid	
is	also	limited.	This	is	because	physical	and	institutional	infrastructures	are	poor,	there	is	no	
experience	and	skill	in	managing	large-scale	investment	projects,	the	market	is	in	an	
embryonic	stage	and	property	rights	are	not	protected.	
Political	considerations	will	result	in	a	significant	increase	in	private	and	public	EC	funds	
being	channelled	into	eastern	Europe	but	it	will	not	be	of	a	magnitude	that	will	starve	
developing	Asian	countries	of	such	funds	from	the	EC.	Some	Asian	countries,	especially	the	
South	Asian	ones,	will	suffer	more,	particularly	as	far	as	the	receipt	of	foreign	aid	is	
concerned.	Others,	especially	the	Asian	NIEs	and	near-NIEs,	will	benefit	from	the	increased	
demand	for	capital	goods	arising	from	the	economic	reconstruction	of	eastern	Europe.	The	
dynamic	economic	performances	of	these	Asian	countries	will	continue	to	attract	EC	direct	
investment.	If	the	demands	of	eastern	European	reconstruction	are	to	be	met	it	will	be	
more	likely	to	be	at	the	expense	of	investment	in	the	peripheral	areas	of	the	EC.	
Conclusions	
If	the	EC	were	to	adopt	an	outward-looking	strategy	in	its	dealings	with	the	rest	of	the	world	
after	1992	and	if	beggar-my-neighboui"	policies	are	not	adopted	by	the	various	trade	blocs,	
the	major	trading	nations	of	Asia	will	benefit	from	the	1992	exercise.	An	increase	in	the	EC's	
GDP	will	increase	its	demand	for	imports,	which	will	the	negate	the	trade	diversion	effect	
and	increase	the	level	of	economic	activity	in	the	rest	of	the	world.	Those	Asian	countries	
which	are	efficient	producers	of	goods	demanded	by	the	EC	will	benefit.	They	will	also	
benefit	from	the	increase	in	demand	for	capital	goods	that	will	accompany	the	economic	
reconstruction	of	the	East	European	countries.	The	past	economic	and	export	performances	
of	the	Asian	NIEs	and	near-NIEs	suggest	that	they	will	be	the	ones	most	likely	to	gain	from	
these	developments	in	western	and	eastern	Europe.	
These	gains	can	be	strengthened	by	a	more	sustained	effort	to	break	into	the	European	
market.	Asian	NIEs	and	near-NIEs	account	for	only	a	relatively	small	part	of	the	EC's	imports.	
They	have	tended	to	concentrate	on	the	American	market,	partly	because	of	its	large	size	
and	partly	because	the	American	dollar	has	been	over-valued.	The	gains	can	also	be	
increased	by	a	more	targeted	approach	to	marketing	in	Europe.	Protectionist	measures	will	
remain	for	sectors	such	as	agriculture,	some	steel	products,	cars,	textiles	and	clothing	and	
some	electronics	products,	where	structural	adjustment	is	overdue,	and	may	even	increase	
for	sectors	considered	important	for	the	future	such	as	aircraft	and	telecommunications.	
These	measures	have	also	been	concentrated	on	Japan	and	the	Asian	NIEs,	which	need	to	
diversify	their	exports	to	the	EC	by	moving	away	from	highly	protected	industries	into	the	
less	protected	capital	goods	sector.	
The	effectiveness	of	the	Asian	response	will	be	increased	by	investing	directly	in	the	EC.	This	
has	been	recognised	by	the	Japanese	and	their	direct	investment	in	the	EC	in	recent	years	
has	increased	very	substantially.	It	is	a	step	which	should	be	considered	very	seriously	by	
the	Asian	NIEs	and	near-NIEs,	as	the	EC	may	react	to	the	pain	of	structural	adjustment	
within	its	boundaries	by	reducing	competition	from	outside.	
On	balance,	the	Europe	1992	plan	should	be	seen	as	a	boon	and	not	a	bane	for	the	major	
trading	nations	of	Asia.	Other	Asian	countries,	especially	those	which	have	to	depend	on	
foreign	aid	to	make	ends	meet,	will	find	the	going	a	great	deal	more	difficult.	But	such	
countries	will	find	things	tough	whether	or	not	the	1992	plan	takes	place.	
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